"GETTYSBURG"
In 1859, only four years before Gettysburg, Napoleon III had smashed the Austrian's at the battle of Solferino
by means of a heavy bombardment followed by a frontal assault. Solferino was, in its time, the great battle of
Europe. More men had fought there than would fight at Gettysburg. Confederate General James Pettigrew wrote
about Solferino before the Civil War, "The invention of the minie ball and the rifled connon would, it was
thought, abolish cavalry and reduce infantry charges within a small compass, Solferino proved this
expectation false."
Now on July 3, 1863, General R. E. Lee had found himself in a tight spot. After two days of desperate fighting
on enemy soil and far from his supply base, his fine army had failed to live up to his expectations. The Union
line had not been broken. It was time for a desperate all-or-nothing action.
Napoleon III's success at Solferino my have been weighing heavily upon his mind as he examined the unbroken
Union lines on Cemetery Ridge. Lee was well trained in the contemporary military axioms which asserted that bold
aggressive action will defeat any enemy. He was also possibly the most aggressive soldier in his army and "the hunt
was up!" He wanted this battle to end and end quickly. Therefore, he chose to deliver a massive strike to the
Union center.
To deliver this decisive blow he wanted his most trusted "post-Jackson" subordinate, General Longstreet, to lead
the attack. Lee requested his favorite divisions of Hood and McClaws to crush the Union positions. However,
Longstreet, who did not want this battle let alone this futile attack, realized that these two divisions had been
shot to pieces the day before in the Wheat Field, Peach Orchard, Devil's Den, and Little Round Top. He replied to
Lee, "Why don't you let Hill's corps win some renown today?"
General Lee modified his plan after he appreciated the condition of Longstreet's men. But he would still use on of
Longstreet's divisions, commanded by George Pickett, to spearhead the attack.
Pickett's division was comprised entirely of Virginians. Although all were veterans, they had missed the first two
days of the battle. In fact, they had not seen a major fight in a year. Having just arrived on the field, they were
relatively fresh, confident, and high-spirited. One regiment had enough vinegar to engage in a green apple fight even
after they were informed of the task awaiting them!
Gallant as they were, they could not be expected to carry the enemy position alone. So Lee searched for supporting troops.
They would have to come from General A. P. Hill's corps. Although this corps had been severely engaged in the previous
two days, Lee was either not informed just how badly damaged these units were or he did not want to hear any excuses.
General Henry Heth's was the first division chosen for support. It just happened to be in the right place at the wrong
time. This division included Brigadeer General J. R. Davis's brigade and the 11th Mississippi. Not heavily engaged on July
2, they were fatefully, encamped almost exactly at the formation line for the advance.
Heth was also in trouble. In his first action as division commander he apparently disregarded Lee's order not to engage the
enemy. Instead on July 1, his men initiated this titanic struggle. In the process his division suffered almost 40% casualties.
In most cases this percentage would end a unit's fighting effectiveness and they were chosen to be the left wing of the most
important advance in the most important battle of the war.
In addition to casualties in the ranks, Heth's division had taken appalling casualties in the offier cadre. Two brigades were
now being commanded by senior colonels. Heth himself had been wounded; a minie ball struck him in the head while he was wearing
a new but oversized hat, stuffed with newspaper. Heth was knocked senseless, but he was lucky he wasn't killed. As senior
brigidier, General Pettigrew would have to command his division in the assault. Now Pettigrew's brigade would also be commanded
by a senior colonel. Davis would be the only brigadier general leading his own brigade in the advance.
General Hill could not furnish another complete division so an ad hoc unit was formed. Two brigades from Pender's division would
support the center of the attack. Pender was wounded on July 2, so these brigades would be under the command of the aging
General Trimble. Trimble was accompanying the army but had no men to command until this point. Two brigades of General Anderson's
Division were assigned to protect Pickett's right flank. Unfortunately, Pettigrew's left flank would receive no such support.
Now that the units were selected, Lee apparently failed to realize there would not be three full divisions of the theoretical 15,000
men. Because of the previous day's heavy casualties there would be a little under 12,000 men to make and support the assault. The
leading brigades of the attack would only present about 9,000 men ~ and over half of them were spent.
The 11th Mississippi volunteer infantry regiment served in General Joe Davis's brigade of Heth's Division. General Davis, though
amiable and competent, had no experience leading men in combat. Most of his fellow officers felt he go the position because he was
the President's nephew. He was obviously not on of Lee's favorites. Worse, Davis's brigade had not been together before Gettysburg.
These regiments were the 2nd, 11th, and 42nd Mississippi, and the 55th North Carolina.
Of these regiments, the 2nd and 11th Mississippi were the most veteran. They had been in the war since the beginning and had fine
reputations as fighting units. These two units had always fought strongly side-by-side. Naturally, the men of these regiments
had become very close.
The 42nd Mississippi had been together over a year and had some veterans in the ranks, but they had never seen fighting in the
Eastern Theater. Because another Mississippi regiment was not available, the sparkling new 55th North Carolina was added to fill
out the brigade. These two regiments would receive their bloody baptism of fire at Gettysburg.
On July 1, Heth's division opened the battle. By luck of the marching order, Davis's brigade began the fighting against Buford's
cavalry. However, Davis was minus the veteran 11th who were, also by luck, ordered to guard the division wagon trains at Cashtown.
The Brigade saw both success and disaster during the fight. While the men in the ranks fought very well, the veterans of the 11th
and, its veteran colonel, were sorely missed.
In the desperate fighting down the Chambersburg Pike, the Brigade suffered appalling casualties. While in the euphoria of capturing
some guns and over running a Union position near McPherson's Ridge, they found themselves flanked. Driven to shelter in an unfinished
railroad cut, they were attacked and trapped by the Union forces which included elements of the famous "Iron Brigade." After a frenzied
struggle half of the veteran 2nd Mississippi and its colours were captured. The rest of the brigade retired from the field less some
500 casualties.
For the 11th Mississippi, July 1 was spent moving to a position "contiguous to the wagon yard" in Cashtown. The men rigged shelter-halves
against the expected rain, watched troops march rapidly past, and listened to the rumble of distant guns.
Before twilight of July 1, the 320 men of the 11th received their orders to hasten to Gettysburg. When they arrived on the field they were
happy to learn that their comrades fought well. However, they were terribly saddened to learn of so many losses including the Colonels of
both the 2nd Mississippi and 55th North Carolina.
On July 2, the men of the Davis brigade spent their time tending to their wounded, reorganizing, collecting
wounded of other units, and gathering abandoned weapons from the first day's fight. All day they could hear
the sounds of heavy skirmishing and late in the afternoon the unmistakable sounds of major assaults slamming
the Union lines. While all of all men were anxious about the day's outcome few were saddened by their absence
from the fight in light of the pounding they took the previous day.
On the morning of July 3, the Brigade was marched into position near Spangler's woods along with the rest of
Pettigrew's men. Here they were informed of their herculean task. Officer and men grew somber.
Unlike the men of Pickett's division, the spirit of Pettigrew's men wasn't quite as effervescent. They had suffered
greatly and were very grim about their chances in the upcoming assault. They were no less resolved, but they were more
realistic and they realized the condition of their regiments. One brigade band was drawn up to play lively and patriotic
music such as "Dixie" to bolster the spirit of the men. Most soldiers disdained this noise and preferred solitude in quiet
contemplation of home and duty. One young sergeant from Tennessee, walked a little way out in the clearing to observe the
Union lines. In open contemplation he asked himself, "June Kimble are you going to do your duty today?"
It was apparent to all that Pettigrew's men had suffered much in the previous day's fighting. In fact while General Lee
rode with General Trimble to inspect the disposition of Pettigrew's and Trimble's brigades he commented, "Many of these poor
boys should go to the rear; they are not fit for duty. (But) the attack must succeed."
Indeed the attack must succeed. But they would be attacking a determined enemy waiting almost a mile away. Almost 6,000 grim
veterans of the Union II corps commanded by General Hancock were peering over their little rock walls and fortifications.
Although they had fought with the controversial Union Army of the Potomac, these regiments had never lost a colour yet had
captured 15. Also waiting were over 100 guns of the finest artillery in the world including Major Osborne's XI corps guns
positioned atop Cemetery Hill. This position allowed for a evil field-of-fire against Pettigrew's left flank and front.
For the two previous days the Army of the Potomac had beaten back charge after desperate charge. Early in the morning there
was heavy fighting on their right. . . but again their lines held. Now as the noon hour approached a lull settled over the
battlefield. But the Loyalists knew better than to think that they had heard, or seen, the last of their aggressive southern
antagonists.
July 3 was hot and getting hotter. It would eventually top 85. The sun blazed down on the soldiers out in the open. The men
of the Davis brigade were luckier than most as they had the shade of the trees to protect them from the heat. Still, during
the pre-charge lull, men lounged lazily in the heat, chatted idly, and wiped the burning sweat from their eyes. Most men, after
they resolved themselves to their duty, made their peace, and finalized their affairs to the best of their ability turned their
attention to their hunger pangs. Many a thread-bare haversack was turned inside out in a vain search for one more morsel of
biscuit, green apple, or piece of fat bacon.
Just shy of 1:30, according to Confederate watch, battalion commanders order their men to lay down. The seasoned veterans
leisurely complied after their company officers sternly repeated the order. But there did not seem to be an emergencey
sufficient enough to warrant such exertion. Then, two cannon discharges broke the silence. These were quickly followed
by over 140 guns of the Confederate army.