The future of Russian democracy has never been more in doubt than during this present crisis which has brought Russia to the brink of economic collapse and social chaos. Prior to this recent crisis, the most serious political crisis in Russia occurred in 1993 when President Boris Yeltsin used tanks to disband the legislative branch. Exact figures were never released, but several hundred people were killed and wounded. At that time, however, the bulk of the population believed in Yeltsin, his government, and had faith in his course of reforms. More importantly, the political and economic elite backed Yeltsin.
The situation today is much more volatile than in 1993. If this were
1917 Lenin would characterize the situation as prerevolutionary. The vast
majority of the population has been devastated by market reforms. The Russian
people do not trust the government and do not believe that Yeltsin is capable
of governing. People no longer have faith in market reforms and equate
"democracy" with societal weakness. Especially important is the fact that
the political and economic elite no longer are assured Yeltsin supporters,
and in fact they are more likely to be opponents. Two factors explain why,
in two short years, Yeltsin has lost his most important base of support.
First, personal bickering and personality clashes have alienated the elite
from Yeltsin. Second, if Russia is to emerge from this economic crisis
it will need tax revenues,
and that means a collision course with the economic elite, who, during
the first Chernomyrdin government escaped paying billions of rubles in
taxes which contributed to the eventual collapse of the ruble and Russia's
default on its loans. There is no doubt that Kirilenko's attempts to force
large companies to pay taxes contributed to his removal. As during Soviet
times, oligarchs are running Russia.
The combination of the loss of elite support, the alienation of the Russian population, and the erosion of legitimacy of the Yeltsin government and his own presidency means that it is likely the present crisis will lead to the collapse of the Russian government and the removal or resignation of Yeltsin. Unlike previous crises which were played out among a small group within the political elite, the coming political crash in Russia will involve large numbers of people. Given the breakdown of law and order, mass violence and bloodshed are not unimaginable. One can only hope that the military will remain a source of stability during the coming collapse of Russia and will not allow the use of nuclear weapons against regions, ethnic groups, or even foreign nations.
As Russia collapses, it remains an open question whether Russia continues to exist as we know it--a multiethnic federation--but I suspect the weakness of the center will set in motion processes that will eventually lead to the disintegration of Russia as a multiethnic state.
The critical questions for the United States are twofold: what type of regime in Moscow will emerge from the ashes and what will be its foreign policy orientation? An easy way to understand the likely outcome is to ask: who will support democracy and market reforms in Russia's post-Yeltsin society? What social groups or interests stand to gain from a continuation of policies dating from 1992? The answer reveals the weakness of Russian reform: very few people indeed, perhaps only a few tens of thousands. The bulk of society has a vested interest in seeing significant change in both economic and political policies.
The second question is: if Russia disintegrates into a loose confederation of regions and/or ethnically-based states, what should the US do? The US is completely unprepared for this scenario, just as in August 1991 the US was unprepared for the disintegration of the USSR. But the fact of the matter is that all regions in Russia have become more autonomous, particularly in Siberia where there have been serious discussions of secession for several years already. Economic collapse in the center and the delegitimation of Yeltsin's rule may the catalyst to disintegration.
On either of these questions the prospects for the US and our interests do not look good. The chances are that a post-Yeltsin government will be more authoritarian, less market-oriented, and less pro-Western in its foreign and economic policies. Or we will be faced with a multiplicity of states, leaders, and policies. The Clinton administration would do well to begin to consider the future of a post-Yeltsin Russia.
* Stephen Wegren is an Associate Professor of Political Science, Southern
Methodist University. He recently returned from a six week research
trip to Russia.