OBSERVATIONAL ECUMENICISM,
HOLIST SECTARIANISM:
THE QUINE-CARNAP CONFLICT
ON METAPHYSICAL REALISM

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Abstract: Do any significant philosophical differences between Quine and Carnap follow from Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s analytic-synthetic distinction? Not if they both understand empirical evidence in merely observational terms. But it follows from Quine’s rejection of the distinction that empirical evidence has degrees of holophrastic depth penetrating even into logic and ontology (gradualism). Thus his reasons to prefer realism to idealism are holophrastically empirical. I discuss Quine’s holist sectarian realism on private languages, externalism versus internalism, unobserved objects, unobservable abstract entities, bivalence, ecumenicism versus sectarianism, and on gradualism itself.

It is often held that pragmatism and verificationism each imply ecumenicism, and that Quine and Carnap are therefore both ecumenicists. And indeed for Carnap, realism and idealism are equally nonsensical because no possible observation can be evidence for or against them. But Quine’s robust realism plainly contradicts this very plausible portrait. Quine repeatedly gives reasons for preferring realism to idealism, reasons which can only be holophrastically empirical according to his own theory. This calls for a new distinction between observational and holist empirical equivalence, leading to three kinds of ecumenicism and sectarianism.

I shall argue that the term “empirical equivalence” is implicitly ambiguous for Quine in a way that Quine seems unaware of, and that while he is an observational (stimulus) ecumenicist, he is implicitly what I call a holist sectarian on metaphysical realism and on many other issues.

To state my views in advance: I hold that there are eight main differences between Quine and Carnap that result from Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s analytic-synthetic distinction. First, different epistemologies result. As Quine says, the necessary and sufficient condition of his theory of all evidence—
including all ostensibly a priori arguments in logic, mathematics, and philosophy—as holophrastically empirical is precisely his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction and of its alter ego dogma of statements with individual empirical contents. Second, the ostensibly observational “periphery” of our world theory now exists only “relatively” and as a matter of “degree”; and all ostensibly a priori theses have holophrastic empirical content, and thus are holophrastic empirical evidence for their conclusions. While observation statements have the most empirical content and ostensibly a priori statements have the least, all statements share in the empirical content of the theory as a whole. This is Quine’s empirical gradualism. Third, therefore Quine can (and repeatedly does) offer private language arguments which are holophrastic empirical evidence for metaphysical realism. But Carnap denies that any empirical evidence for or against metaphysical realism is possible. Fourth, thus metaphysical realism and idealism, though empirically equivalent for Quine and Carnap alike in the ordinary observational (stimulus-predictive) sense, are implicitly empirically inequivalent for Quine in the holophrastic sense. Fifth, likewise for any two theories which are empirically equivalent in the ordinary sense, if Quine prefers one of them to the other on the basis of any rational considerations at all. For all rational considerations are holophrastically empirical evidence for Quine. For Quine, such pairs of theories include (1) sectarianism versus ecumenicism, (2) classical logic versus intuitionism, and (3) Carnap’s analytic-synthetic distinction versus Quine’s gradualism. Sixth is the alethic difference. Carnap cannot assert metaphysical realism to be true in any language L, but Quine can. Seventh is the doxastic difference. Carnap cannot believe metaphysical realism because it is literally not a meaningful thesis for him. But Quine can have an “unswerving belief in external things,” a “robust realism.” Eighth, Quine’s terms “metaphysical realism,” “external world,” “external thing,” and “external object” are alien terms to Carnap. That is, they cannot even be translated into Carnap’s theory. For they are literally nonsensical to Carnap. If these eight differences are not substantive philosophical differences, what is?

1. GEORGE’S INTERPRETATION OF QUINE AND CARNAP AS ECUMENICISTS

Alexander George argues that since “Quine’s and Carnap’s positions are empirically equivalent (or so they both agree),” since Quine “opts, as it were, for an ecumenical approach to the dispute between the sectarian and the ecumenist,” and since “Quine’s ecumenical perspective [is] well-nigh indistinguishable from the Carnapian one”:

Debate about whether their dispute is empty or instead substantive is, for Quine, itself lacking in content. Quine’s considered position is that . . . whether there are matters on which he and Carnap substantively disagree, whether to adopt a Quinean or a Carnapian perspective on their disagreement—is a question on which nothing hangs. And so perhaps at this level, where the very substance of Quine’s dispute with Carnap is at issue, they are one.
The problem is that George floats on the observational periphery of Quine’s theory and never enters the holophrastic depths. Thus George misses that Quine’s holophrastic empiricism confers empirical status on Quine’s private language arguments for a “robust realism”\(^{11}\) of “external things”\(^{12}\) or “external objects”\(^{13}\) comprising an “external world.”\(^{14}\) That is, for Quine there is holophrastic empirical evidence for metaphysical realism. That is, for Quine metaphysical realism, taken literally, is theory-internal and intelligible. For Carnap, of course, it is theory-external and nonsensical. I think this is the real bone of contention in Quine’s “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology.” The substance of their dispute about the analytic-synthetic distinction is that Quine can find metaphysical realism not only empirically meaningful but, as a thesis at the core of natural science, probably true. Thus the intelligibility of metaphysical realism as a thesis internal to science, and even the probable existence of a metaphysically real world, hang on their dispute.

2. Quine and Carnap on Metaphysical Realism

There are five main issues concerning metaphysical realism for Quine and Carnap. On all five issues, Quine is a realist but Carnap rejects realism as nonsensical. That is because Quine always finds a holophrastically empirical reason to prefer realism, while Carnap can never find any possible observation to decide the issue. The issues are: (1) private language arguments, (2) metaphysical realism as internal to a theory or framework, (3) the Berkeleyan question whether unobserved objects exist, (4) the question (also Berkeleyan) whether universals and other abstract entities exist, and (5) bivalence.

2.1. Private Language Arguments

Quine begins “Ontological Relativity” with a private language argument.\(^{15}\) The argument is based on the empirical fact that language is social. The argument concludes that our objectual meanings or references are not mental ideas, but mind-independent objects. Thus Quine admits metaphysical realism before he raises the problem of inscrutability of reference (which he misleadingly also used to call the thesis of ontological relativity, as if it were an object-language thesis implying that metaphysical realism is false)\(^{16}\) and the problem of indeterminacy of translation, and before he solves those problems by allowing reference to mind-independent objects in our home language through the mere identity transformation. Thus what Quine’s solution is rescuing is metaphysically real objects as our references, just as required by his private language argument. Rabbits, whatever they are, are metaphysically real.\(^{17}\) And that is just the difference Quine draws between himself and Carnap in “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology”:

Let me stress the consequence: If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence. Ontological statements then end up on a par with questions of natural science.\(^{18}\)
Quine’s own ontological statements are just his “robust realism,” his “unswerving belief in external things—people, nerve endings, sticks, stones.”

All this is anathema to Carnap. That there exist mind-independent things is just what Carnap defines as metaphysical realism. And metaphysical realism is just what he rejects as literally nonsensical, external to scientific theory, and at best a linguistic proposal. This is why Carnap does not and cannot give a private language argument, and why he can only move from a linguistic proposal of methodological phenomenalism to a pragmatically superior linguistic proposal of methodological physicalism. For we cannot accept an argument as logically sound if we reject its conclusion as nonsensical (as neither true nor false).

It might be objected that Quine is not a metaphysical realist because he is constructing (some would say deconstructing) metaphysical realism as Carnapian empirical realism; and while Carnap says it cannot be done, Quine is doing it holophrastically, which goes beyond Carnapian construction. My reply is that this confuses metaphysical realism with Carnapian empirical realism. Carnap is very clear that the former is the thesis that objects are mind-independent, and the latter is the thesis that there are meaningful empirical tests to distinguish objects that are genuinely of a certain sort from fakes, illusions, dreams, and so on, based on coherence or orderliness. Quine is not constructing but reclassifying metaphysical realism, taken in its traditionally intended sense, as admissible within Quine’s own gradualist world theory.

Quine’s private language arguments have nothing to do with Carnap’s empirical realism, which is the only sort of realism that is internal to scientific theory for Carnap. Our ability to tell empirically real living ducks from fake wooden decoys or dreamed or imaginary ducks by using ordinary or scientific means cannot help us resolve the issue of metaphysical realism. Carnap would be the first to tell us that. Nor does Quine raise any such issues in his private language arguments. Indeed, it is only when we take Quine to conclude that our references are metaphysically real that his private language arguments make any sense. For his private language arguments apply just as much to wooden decoys as they do to living ducks.

“Ontological Relativity” would be totally nonsensical if Quine’s robust realism were not metaphysical realism, but only empirical realism. This includes not only the initial private language argument, as we just saw, but also the resulting problems of referential inscrutability and of translational indeterminacy. For these problems arise for empirically real living ducks and fake wooden decoys alike. And it includes the home language solution, which applies to reference to empirically real living ducks and fake wooden decoys alike. Even Berkeley, with his museum of mental meanings to solve these problems, is an empirical realist!

“Two Dogmas,” too, would be totally nonsensical if we construed it as a laborious argument that we can admit ontological statements such as that living ducks are empirically real, as opposed to metaphysically real, into our scientific theory. Only insane people would deny that living ducks are empirically real.
2.2. Metaphysical realism as internal to a theory or framework

Quine says at the very beginning of “Two Dogmas,” “One effect of abandoning [Carnap’s two dogmas of empiricism] is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science.” Quine says at the end of “Two Dogmas,” “Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with questions of natural science. . . . Carnap has recognized that he is able to preserve a double standard for ontological questions and scientific hypotheses only by assuming an absolute distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.” Is the question whether living ducks are on a scientific par with wooden decoys the question on which Quine is expressing his great difference from Carnap? Does Quine think that Carnap is preserving a double standard for living ducks and wooden decoys on the basis of his analytic-synthetic distinction? Does Quine believe that Carnap believes that the statement that there are living ducks is an ontological theory while the statement that there are wooden decoys is a scientific hypothesis? If the answer to these questions is no, then “Two Dogmas” is all about relocating metaphysical realism—not empirical realism—within empirical science. Indeed, how could Quine relocate either Carnap’s empirical realism or his own within empirical science? They are already there by definition.

Here we must not confuse being a statement external to our theory with being a statement about external objects. For Quine, our statements are internal to our theory, but are about mind-independent objects, in the ordinary, pre-philosophical sense of “mind,” to various degrees of holophrastic empirical probability. This is just how he “reconcile[s]” his immanentalism with his robust realism, resulting in his naturalism. His naturalism is just his metaphysical realism’s internality to scientific theory. Metaphysical realism is a thesis, not a world. In “Things and Theories” Quine discusses things and theories. Concerning things, Quine advocates an unabashed metaphysical “robust realism.” Concerning theories, Quine advocates a naturalistic epistemology in which all we can know about the metaphysically real world is theoretical structure. He is by no means denying metaphysical realism, but only saying that there are indefinitely many ways we can referentially slice the real world into objects, and that outside of our theory, there is nothing we can know about objects in themselves. I do not even see any tension between his epistemology and his realism. Quine says, “What evaporates is the transcendental question of the reality of the external world.”

He means that a priori “[t]ranscendental argument [becomes holophrastically empirical] immanent epistemology.” In this way, metaphysical realism is just “[a]nother notion that I would take pains to rescue from the abyss of the transcendental.” Quine explains:

Again I quote Tennant: “All one can judge, according to Quine, is not what there is tout court, but rather only what there is by the lights of a given theory.” This was never my position. True, what one can judge by my criterion of values of variables is only what there is by the lights of a given theory, but...
one can still try, in other ways, to judge what one might best take as values of one’s own variables [in one’s home language]. To judge this is to judge, rightly or wrongly, what there really is.32

Quine says:

[T]ruth should hinge on reality, and it does. No sentence is true but reality makes it so. The sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true, as Tarski has taught us, if and only if real snow is really white. . . .

Here the truth predicate serves, as it were, to point through the sentence to the reality; it serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole point.55

Thus for Quine, sentences are immanent or internal, while the reality true sentences are about is transcendent or external, to language or theory. Carnap says the opposite:

And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: questions of the existence of certain entities within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions. . . .

The concept of reality occurring in internal questions is an empirical, scientific, non-metaphysical concept. To recognize something as a real thing means to succeed in incorporating it into the system of things so that it fits together with the other things recognized as real, according to the rules of the framework.

From these questions we must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. . . . Realists give an affirmative answer; subjective idealists a negative one. . . . And it cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. . . .

If one decides to accept the thing language, there is no objection against saying that he has accepted the world of things. But this must not be interpreted as if it meant his acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world; there is no such belief or assertion or assumption, because it is not a theoretical question. To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language. . . . The acceptance of the thing language leads, on the basis of observations made, also to the acceptance, belief, and assertion of certain statements. But the thesis of the reality of the thing world itself cannot be among these statements, because it cannot be formulated in the thing language or, it seems, in any other theoretical language. . . .54

Now, “the thesis of the reality of the thing world itself” is just what Quine affirms. Quine admits an “antecedently acknowledged external world,”35 which is “the aboriginal posit of ordinary bodies.”36 Bodies are “our primordial reifications, rooted in innate perceptual similarities,”37 our “conceptual firsts.”38 It is “crucial” to evidence and semantics alike that there be a shared objective world.39 Even if physics may become too sophisticated for standard quantification, “The objectivity of our knowledge of the external world remains rooted in our contact with the external world.”40

Both Quine and Carnap admit that we cannot speak outside a theory or framework. But for Quine the thesis that there is an external world can be stated within the thing framework, and therefore can be assumed, asserted,
and even believed on holophrastic empirical grounds. Indeed, it is our most basic assumption, underlying and organizing our entire theory.

2.3. DO OBJECTS EXIST UNOBSERVED?

Carnap and Quine differ on Berkeley’s question whether, as Carnap puts it, “physical objects exist when they are not observed.” It is just this question which Carnap finds literally nonsensical because no observation can conceivably settle it. And it is just this question which Quine answers in the affirmative with his robust realism, referring to Berkeley by name.

Can objects exist independently of being observed? Berkeley denies it, but is at least willing to construct ordinary bodies out of our ideas. Quine says that Berkeley is wrong to take ideas (or sense-data) as given and then try to construct bodies out of them. Rather, ideas (or sense-data) are abstractions constructed within science. Quine says that Berkeley is wrong even phenomenologically, since Gestalt psychologists have shown that

the subject . . . directly senses a body in depth. He goes through none of Berkeley’s inferential construction of the depth dimension, for he is unaware of the two-dimensional data of that construction. A painter has to train himself to abstract those two-dimensional patches from the living scene.

Carnap refuses even to construct the external world. For Carnap, Berkeley’s question is literally nonsensical, and it cannot be constructed as a scientific question about empirical reality without losing its intended sense. Carnap says:

The concept of reality (in the sense of independence from the cognizing consciousness) does not belong within (rational) science, but within metaphysics.

One could try in various ways to give a definition of reality (in the sense of independence of my consciousness) in such a way that the concept becomes constructable. However, one can show in each such case that the concept which is so defined does not agree with the concept as it is meant by realism as well as by idealism. . . . [Thus this] concept of reality cannot be constructed in an experiential constructional system; this characterizes it as a nonrational, metaphysical concept.

Carnap specifies that “questions of the following kind . . . imply a realistic persuasion: whether physical things exist when they are not observed.” But it is just this question which Quine answers in the affirmative with his robust realism, referring to Berkeley and Samuel Johnson by name. Can anyone doubt that for Quine, physical objects exist when they are not perceived? Quine says, “Mama differs from water and red in being, for all her sporadic comings and goings, spatiotemporally continuous.” Quine describes empirical reasons why even infants behaviorally indicate acceptance of an ordinary metaphysical realism of mamas who disappear from view, then reappear. Here Quine is contrasting what he calls the first and second phases of word learning with respect to objective reference, namely, mass terms and object terms. Now, the fifth phase is distinguished by relative descriptions such as “smaller than that speck.” Quine says:
Whereas the non-existence of observable blue apples is tantamount to the
non-existence of blue apples, the non-existence of observable objects smaller
than that speck is not taken as tantamount to the non-existence of objects
smaller than that speck. The notable feature of this fifth phase is . . . that it
enables us . . . to form terms whose references can be admitted to be forever
unobservable without yet being repudiated . . . as non-existent.52

This deepens Quine’s rejection of Berkeley.53

Surely the difference between Quine and Carnap exists because while by
definition there cannot be observations of unobserved objects, there can be
holophrastic empirical grounds for positing unobserved objects on the basis
of observations of other objects, or of what we take to be the same objects at
other times. Thus for Carnap no empirical evidence can decide Berkeley’s
question, but for Quine the empirical evidence is holophrastically over-
whelming that Johnson is right that there is an external world, even if natu-
ralistically we can only know external objects as nodes or posits of our theory.54

Carnap’s scientific construction of statements about objects in remote
places or times is based on verifiability in principle. Namely, he accepts sci-
entific statements about objects in remote places or times as meaningful because
observations are logically possible.55 But he expressly denies that metaphysical
realism is a scientific thesis in this neutral sense.56 Thus, as we saw, he denies
that such constructions capture what is intended by metaphysical realism. For
Carnap, metaphysical realism is literally nonsense, but can be replaced with a
neutral construction using hypothetical statements about what scientists would
observe if they were in a spatiotemporal position to do so.

### 2.4. Universals and Abstract Entities

Berkeley also rejects abstract ideas, and therefore rejects abstract entities as
unintelligible. That is the deepest rejection of realism entailed by his thesis,
esse est percipi. Berkeley directs this thesis against Plato’s forms, which cannot
be perceived but which are ostensibly apprehended by the reason.

Berkeley’s thesis can also be directed against Quine’s abstract objects, which
cannot be perceived but which are ostensibly referred to in a sufficiently
rich holophrastic language. But Quine says:

> And there comes a sixth phase, when we break through to posits more dras-
tically new still than the objects smaller than the smallest visible speck. For the
objects smaller than the smallest visible speck differ from observable objects
only in a matter of degree, whereas the sixth phase ushers in abstract entities.57

Thus Quine rejects Berkeley even here. Quine says, “I am a Predicate and
Class Realist, now as of yore; a deep-dyed realist of abstract universals.”58 But
Carnap rejects universals and other abstract entities as literally nonsensical.59

### 2.5 Bivalence

Quine’s theory of truth is more than mere Tarskian disquotation. Quine
says:
Pursuit of truth is implicit, still, in our use of “true.” We should and do currently accept the firmest scientific conclusions as true, but when one of these is dislodged by further research we do not say that it had been true but became false. We say that to our surprise it was not true after all. Science is seen as pursuing and discovering truth rather than as decreeing it. Such is the idiom of realism, and it is integral to the semantics of the predicate “true.”

For Quine, bivalence and metaphysical realism imply each other. Quine says:

We stalwarts of two-valued logic . . . declare that it is either true or false that there was an odd number of blades of grass in Harvard Yard at the dawn of Commencement Day, 1903. The matter is undecidable, but we maintain that there is a fact of the matter. . . . Similarly for more extravagant undecidables, such as whether there was a hydrogen atom within a meter of some remote point that we may specify by space–time coordinates. And similarly, on the mathematical side, for the continuum hypothesis or the question of the existence of inaccessible cardinals. Bivalence is, as Dummett argues (pp. 145–165), the hallmark of realism.

Indeed, it is scarcely possible for Quine to be a more traditional metaphysical realist. Bivalence is the semantic version of the law of excluded middle. Suárez follows Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book 4, texts 4–5, and book 10, text 11 in finding that “whatever beings exist in the actual order prior to mental activity are either really identical or are really diverse, as otherwise there would be a middle ground between ‘the same’ and ‘other’ . . . .” This is a reductio of irrealism based on excluded middle. But Carnap cannot derive metaphysical realism from bivalence or excluded middle. That is because for Carnap, metaphysical realism is literally nonsense.

For all these issues of realism, and for all issues across the board, the limit to Carnap’s liberal ecumenicism is the individual testability of each statement in the framework in question. Each statement, no matter how deep or how peripheral it may be, must be individually certified as empirically verifiable before we can meaningfully ask for what purposes the framework may be useful or convenient. This is what Carnap’s constructionism is all about. Quine calls it the dogma of reductionism: “the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience.”

Quine is far more liberal. For Quine, individual statements need not be so certified, since it is a theory as a whole that faces the tribunal of experience. This is just what allows Quine to express sectarian preferences for individual theses which are nonsensical to Carnap.

Our interpretation seems the best and most natural one. It takes little charity to assume that Quine is describing his own views clearly and is well aware of how deeply they differ from Carnap’s. But Quine seems confused when he defines a theory’s empirical content as the synthetic observation categoricals (e.g. “If smoke, then fire”) it implies. This does make empirical content an emergent property of a theory as a whole, but it also ensures that a theory’s empirical content is never any deeper than its observational periphery. Therefore I propose the following new distinctions.
3. QUINE’S HOLIST SECTARIANISM

George assumes Carnap’s observational conception of empirical evidence and thus Carnap’s observational conception of empirical equivalence, and unsurprisingly arrives at Carnap’s “playful” view that Quine is hoist with his own petard because his gradualism is empirically equivalent to, and therefore is as analytic and as empirically empty as, Carnap’s analytic-synthetic distinction. But implicitly for Quine, they are not empirically equivalent in the holophrastic sense, since he prefers gradualism on the basis of rational arguments he deems holophrastically empirical. Thus for Quine, there is no “symmetry,” no “double-edged sword,” no “parity of reasoning,” pace George’s “they both agree.” And implicitly for Quine, that is holophrastically empirical evidence that Carnap and Quine do not accept the same holism, pace George and Tomida. Quine agrees that his gradualism and Carnap’s distinction are empirically equivalent only in the observational sense. As we shall see, Quine is well aware that stimuli are only the tip of the gradualist iceberg of empirical evidence.

For Carnap and George there is no fact of the matter about realism versus idealism, the analytic-synthetic distinction versus gradualism, sectarianism versus ecumenicism, or classical logic versus intuitionism, since they admit only observational equivalence. But for Quine there is implicitly a holophrastic empirical fact of the matter in all of these disputes, since he finds reason to take sides in all of them, and for him reasons are always holophrastically empirical.

George might well object that even the difference between observational and holophrastically empirical evidence simmers down to a question of words, since it is merely “conditioned” on (i.e. logically determined by) Quine’s perspective on the analytic-synthetic distinction. But that does not work for realism. Realism does not simmer down to a question of words, since it is not merely conditioned on Quine’s perspective on the analytic-synthetic distinction. For realism, the issue is underdetermination of our home theory by the periphery of experience, not referential inscrutability or translational indeterminacy, and is not a mere question of words. For Quine bases his private language arguments on the empirical fact that we communicate with each other. “What is utterly factual is just the fluency of conversation and the effectiveness of negotiation that one or another manual of translation serves to induce.” Quine praises Gibson for his clarity on underdetermination as being wholly different from referential inscrutability and translational indeterminacy in this respect. Per the latter two theses, objects are mere nodes of theory; “rabbit” may refer to whole rabbits, undetached rabbit parts, or temporal rabbit slices. But on the former thesis, such nodal rabbits, whatever they are, are external objects.

This suggests refining George as follows. Carnap’s acceptance of the analytic-synthetic distinction ‘conditions’, i.e., logically determines, that realism versus idealism is a mere question of words. But Quine’s rejection of the distinction determines not whether or not realism versus idealism is a mere
question of words, but instead that the door is open to answering that question either way, depending on the empirical facts. We may say that Carnap’s perspective directly determines one actual answer to the question, namely that the dispute is merely verbal, while Quine’s perspective indirectly determines two possible answers. Even better, we may say that Carnap’s perspective determines that one answer as opposed to the other is determined, while Quine’s perspective determines that neither answer is determined, since both answers are underdetermined—and not by his rejection of the distinction, but by the empirical facts about communication. And the actual empirical facts about communication happen to be evidence that the dispute is not merely verbal. This may seem the slightest of logical asymmetries. But the possibility and even the intelligibility of showing that there is a real world hang in the balance. The asymmetry is that for Quine, the real world hangs indirectly in the balance. One might object that even metaphysical realism’s truth or nonsense is a difference that makes no empirical difference. What does it matter to our evidence or our lives if there is a metaphysically real world? My reply is that this question has already been asked and answered. In terms of empirical equivalence in the ordinary observational sense, it makes no difference. But in terms of empirical equivalence in the holophrastic sense, it makes all the difference. The private language arguments are a major part of the holophrastic evidence.

We may say that Quine’s epistemological holism (or gradualism) implies this principle: Insofar as a thesis has holophrastic empirical content, it is itself able to serve in turn as holophrastic empirical evidence for or against other theses. The history of science is filled with examples. Scientists are always using hypotheses, understood as supported by observations, to argue for or against other hypotheses further removed from observations.78

The private language arguments are a case in point. The hypothesis that we engage in public communication is based on ordinary observations. The more theoretical hypothesis that there is an external world is then based in turn on the communication hypothesis. This may seem obvious and trivial. Yet it implies that empirical equivalence is best understood as not concerning merely the observational periphery of science, but as having depth, indeed, as penetrating to the core of science. Surely Quine’s persisting as late as 1992 in defining empirical equivalence in terms of peripheral stimulus-predictiveness is an anachronism, a relic of the atomistic one-statement-one-empirical-content view he rejects. It is therefore an impediment to understanding Quine’s epistemic holism. Quine’s definition may be basic to comparing theories on an observational level,79 but that very aim is too elementary. Every theorist aims to explain the appearances as well as other theorists. Therefore a merely observational agreement is the least interesting possible sort of empirical agreement for scientists—or philosophers—to discuss. If a scientific community already grasps the basic observational uniformities in its field, then the deeper theoretical uniformities based on deeper but still empirical considerations are what really matter. Quine is well aware of this. In one paper he merely assigns “evidential priority” to
observations, and allows well-established theory to count as “indirect evidence.” Indirect evidence is always holophrastic. The deeper a thesis is in the holist web, the more indirect evidence it is, and the less likely to change. Quine says indirect evidence can positively imply or make theses probable, while observational evidence is “only negative” in Popper’s sense of disconfirming theory.

I propose the following definition of a second and deeper sort of empirical equivalence, to be called holophrastic equivalence. Two theories are holophrastically equivalent if (1) they are observationally (stimulus-predictively) equivalent, and (2) every sentence of either theory, however far removed from the so-called observational periphery, has a counterpart sentence in the other which is “cognitively equivalent” in Quine’s sense, i.e., which has the same “empirical content,” if any, in Quine’s sense. Quine says, “Sentences are cognitively equivalent . . . if putting one for the other does not affect the empirical content of any set of sentences,” where “the empirical content of a testable sentence or set of sentences for [a given] speaker [or, by extension, community] is the set of all the synthetic observation categoricals that it implies, plus all synonymous ones.” He says, “A set of sentences that implies some synthetic observation categoricals . . . may be said to have . . . empirical content.” Beyond that, “I see no . . . rigorous standard of shared content.”

My definition of holophrastic equivalence is based on Quine’s definition of cognitive equivalence, and therefore shares its status as an ideal schema and its resistance to decisive application. Quine’s definition “resists decisive application . . . because of the rather visionary status of empirical content.” More precisely, all three definitions—my definition of holophrastic equivalence and Quine’s definitions of cognitive equivalence and of empirical content—are relative to our scientific background assumptions.

On condition (2) of my definition, every subset S of sentences of a theory T is cognitively equivalent to some subset S1 of sentences of theory T1, if T1 is holophrastically equivalent to T. Condition (2) does not imply that every term in the existing vocabulary of T is cognitively equivalent to some term of T1. But such a term can always be introduced into T1 by contextual definition, since every sentence of T containing a given term has a counterpart sentence in T1.

On condition (1), all holophrastically equivalent theories are observationally equivalent. But not all observationally equivalent theories are holophrastically equivalent. Quine’s global theory and Carnap’s global theory are a case in point. Quine’s thesis of robust realism has no counterpart thesis in Carnap. Indeed, Carnap rejects Quine’s metaphysical realism as literally nonsensical. Quine’s terms “robust realism,” “external things,” “external objects,” and “external world” are all alien terms—and literally nonsensical terms—to Carnap. Carnap is completely sectarian when it comes to choosing between Quine’s global theory and his own where such alien terms are concerned. In the lexicon of Quine, Carnap cannot even get the swing of such alien terms, i.e., cannot simply learn them as new words.
My two senses of “empirically equivalent” yield three senses of the terms “sectarian” and “ecumenical.” These may be called observational sectarianism and ecumenicism, extreme holophrastic sectarianism and ecumenicism, and holist sectarianism and ecumenism. I shall explain these three senses in order.

First, whenever Quine discusses sectarianism versus ecumenicism, he is considering whether to be sectarian or ecumenicist about theories which are observationally equivalent. This is observational sectarianism versus observational ecumenicism.

Second, I raise the new and very different question whether to be sectarian or ecumenicist about theories which are holophrastically equivalent. This is extreme holophrastic sectarianism versus extreme holophrastic ecumenicism.

Third, when Quine has a holophrastic empirical reason to prefer one theory to another which is observationally equivalent to it, this is holist sectarianism. Holist sectarianism is not observational sectarianism. For when Quine discusses observational sectarianism versus observational holism, he is not looking for empirical reasons to prefer one observationally equivalent theory to another. For he reasonably assumes that the rival theories in question are observationally equivalent, and he unthinkingly equates observational equivalence with its genus, empirical equivalence. Thus when he seeks to be an observational sectarian, he is constrained into taking himself to be looking for broadly speaking logical, linguistic, or pragmatic reasons, as opposed to empirical reasons, to prefer one theory over the other.

Holist sectarianism is not extreme holophrastic sectarianism either. For we can discuss extreme holophrastic sectarianism only concerning theories we have reasonably assumed to be holophrastically equivalent. And by definition, theories are holophrastically equivalent if and only if there is no empirical reason, observational or holophrastic, for preferring one to the other. Thus the issue of extreme holophrastic sectarianism versus extreme holophrastic ecumenicism logically cannot arise for rival theories if we have any empirical reason for preferring one to the other.

Extreme holophrastic ecumenicism is preferable to extreme holophrastic sectarianism. For by definition there can be no empirical grounds, either observational or holophrastic, to prefer one theory to a holophrastic equivalent. And there will be no necessarily alien terms, since any term in a sentence of either theory can be contextually defined using the counterpart sentence in the other theory.

There is no fourth sense of “ecumenicism” or “sectarianism.” There is no converse holist sense of these terms, no matricial mix-and-match with the three senses already explained. For by definition, all holophrastically equivalent theories are also observationally equivalent. Thus no theory can be preferred to a holophrastically equivalent theory for observational reasons.

All this is implicit in Quine’s distinction between observational evidence and indirect evidence. And it is a leap over the narrowest of ditches from Quine’s definition of cognitive equivalence to my definition of holophrastic equivalence. Yet Quine never distinguishes between two senses of “empirical equivalence,” much less three senses of “ecumenicism” and of “sectarianism.”
The conflict in Quine is this. Quine’s private language arguments are holophrastic empirical evidence for realism, leading him to adopt realism and reject idealism. Thus realism and idealism are empirically inequivalent in the holophrastic sense for him, and thus so are his and Carnap’s global theories. Yet because Quine defines empirical equivalence as observational equivalence, he agrees with Carnap that their global theories are empirically equivalent.

The conflict can be easily resolved by adopting my distinctions. Namely, Quine’s realism is holist sectarian. That is, it is observationally equivalent to idealism, but he has holophrastically empirical reasons to prefer it. And that would be the natural and direct Quinean solution. For the possibility of holophrastic inequivalences is implicit in his gradualism. But instead of explaining and removing the conflict in this natural and direct way, Quine covers it up with a distinction between truth and warrant. In two texts, he argues for sectarianism and against ecumenicism, but then adopts ecumenicism in the end, justifying the flip-flop in terms of his truth-warrant distinction. Reading holist sectarianism for “truth” and observational ecumenicism for “warrant,” Quine is saying in effect that among scientific theories, observational equivalences outweigh holophrastic empirical differences. It seems to me that in science, the opposite is true. Holist sectarianism is what advanced science is all about.

The first text is Quine’s “Reply to Roger F. Gibson, Jr.” Following Føllesdal, Quine affirms sectarianism in cases of empirically equivalent theories where one theory contains an alien term, i.e., a theoretical term not reducible to or translatable to the terminology of the other theory. Quine calls this his “newly recovered” sectarianism. For the theory with the “alien” term abandons “the scientist’s quest for economy and . . . the empiricist’s standard of meaningfulness.” If we cannot “annex” the alien terms to our theory, then “the other [theory] does not even make sense in our terms.” “Scientifically undigested” terms include “essence,” “grace,” and “nirvana.” Quine concludes, “Our own system is true by our lights, and the other does not even make sense in our terms.” But just after Quine newly recovers sectarianism, he suddenly abandons sectarianism. He says that if we still regard the rival theories as empirically equivalent, “surely we must recognize the two as equally warranted.” We can even get “the swing of the alien jargon without benefit of translation.” This is an ecumenicist position if there ever was one.

The second text is Pursuit of Truth. Quine’s reasoning changes, but remains just as conflicted. He rejects his 1987 reason for adopting sectarianism concerning alien terms, and now considers only empirically equivalent theories which are equally simple. But he still finds reasons to prefer sectarianism to ecumenicism concerning alien terms—and still abandons sectarianism, finding the sectarianism-ecumenism dispute a “question of words.” Once again, this is based on the truth-warrant distinction. Once again, Quine concludes ecumenically that sectarianism and ecumenism are equally warranted.
Quine is struggling with the question which view, ecumenicism or sectarianism, is more appropriate for his empiricism. Repeatedly, he finds that only sectarianism makes any sense in alien term cases. Yet his definition of empirical equivalence as observational equivalence makes ecumenicism win by definition. To cover up the superficiality of the win, he pulls the truth-warrant distinction out of the old pragmatist hat—a distinction Russell criticized long ago. But the cover-up is empty—truly a mere question of words. For “equally warranted” simply means observationally equivalent. Surely the best way to make Quine’s position consistent is to find him a truth-sectarian and a warrant-ecumenicist, that is, a holist sectarian and an observational ecumenicist. The alien term argument is, of course, holophrastically empirical.

Quine’s truth-warrant distinction implies that he can only accept ecumenicism as false but equally warranted in alien term cases, since only sectarianism can be preferred as true in alien term cases. Would it not be preferable to prefer the theory which is true and equally warranted? Worse, relying merely on warrant leaves him without an empirical reason to prefer ecumenicism, since sectarianism is equally “warranted.” George seems to sense the problem. Worst of all, Quine finds a holophrastically empirical reason to prefer realism to idealism, namely the existence of communication. On his own restriction of empirical equivalence to observational equivalence, he ought to say that realism and idealism are equally warranted, and ought to take the ecumenical approach. After all, Berkeley has a theory of public communication that is just as faithful to the observational facts, i.e., to the observational periphery.

We may say that for Quine, all empirically equivalent theories are equivalent, but some are more equivalent than others. George says that Quine’s finding ecumenicism and sectarianism equally warranted observationally, and therefore Quine’s finding the issue a mere question of words, are a second-level ecumenicism about ecumenicism and sectarianism. But this second-level ecumenicism is third-level sectarian. After all, it is a sectarian preference for ecumenicism over sectarianism! And it is self-defeating to have a sectarian preference for ecumenism—unless it is a holist sectarian preference for observational ecumenism over observational sectarianism.

The truth is that Quine’s definition of empirical equivalence is a relic of pre-gradualist empiricism and needs updating, or at least a companion definition—a gradualist definition of empirical equivalence as holophrastic equivalence.

4. Quine’s Holist Sectarian Preferences

All this may be very well for realism versus idealism, and for global theories only one of which includes realism. But what about all the other pairs of observationally equivalent theories where Quine seems to be preferring one theory not on empirical grounds, but on pragmatic, logical, or even linguistic grounds? I am referring to (1) sectarianism versus ecumenicism, (2)
classical logic versus intuitionism, and (3) the analytic-synthetic distinction versus gradualism.

To start with, I think that pragmatic reasons are empirical reasons. For example, if we could not predict that simplicity tends to yield better theories, in our empirical experience of theories, it would not be pragmatic to prefer simpler theories as such.

I think Quine would agree. Granted, he says that simplicity and pragmatism are our ultimate guide on what objects there are, and this might seem as if simplicity is more ultimate than empirical evidence. But he argues that simplicity, as such, is evidence. Quine says, “Insofar, simplicity itself—in some sense of this difficult term—counts as a kind of evidence; and scientists have indeed long tended to look upon the simpler of two hypotheses as not merely the more likable, but the more likely.” Quine makes the point at greater length:

Having noted that man has no evidence for the existence of bodies beyond the fact that their assumption helps him organize experience, we should have done well, instead of disclaiming evidence for the existence of bodies, to conclude: such then, at bottom, is what evidence is, both for ordinary bodies and for molecules.

This point about evidence does not upset the evidential priority of sense data. On the contrary, the point about evidence is precisely that the testimony of the senses does (contrary to Berkeley’s notion) count as evidence for bodies, such being (as Samuel Johnson perceived) just the sort of thing that evidence is.

Here, simplicity is evidence. The very simplicity of positing an external world to organize our experience is the most basic evidence that there is an external world. It can only be indirect empirical evidence in Quine’s sense of “indirect evidence,” since it is scarcely observational evidence. The second paragraph in the quotation just above shows that for Quine, the simplicity of assuming an external world is empirical evidence for the very sort of metaphysical realism that Berkeley denies and Johnson admits. Carnap denies this, since there logically cannot be any evidence for a literally nonsensical view. Carnap says:

[I]t would be wrong to [say]: “The fact of the efficiency of the thing language is confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world”; we should rather say instead, “This fact makes it advisable to accept the thing language.”

As Richard Creath perceptively says, “The choices that Carnap takes to be pragmatic are just those where no question of truth arises. But...the chief consequence of Quine’s pragmatism is to make plausible the reliance on simplicity and conservatism as the main pillars of his theory of knowledge.” Carnap’s pragmatism concerning the thing language is theory-external and purely non-evidential. But Quine’s pragmatic simplicity is theory-internal evidence for metaphysical realism. Quine’s conservatism is indirect empirical evidence for metaphysical realism as well, if it is rational pragmatism at all. For realism is too deep to be easily revised.

Simplicity is also indirect evidence for realism via Quine’s private lan-
guage arguments. For a real external world is the simplest way to organize our experience of public communication. Simplicity is also the indirect empirical evidence that decides the issue of classical logic versus intuitionism for Quine. For Quine’s reason for preferring classical logic is that it simplifies things. Thus simplicity is also indirect evidence for realism via Quine’s bivalence thesis (see section 2.5).

Consider also the following two arguments in support of my view.

First, in Quine’s epistemological web, every argument has a holophrastic empirical content. Thus no argument is purely rational, purely pragmatic, or even purely linguistic in Quine’s web. And no arguments are ever outside the web for Quine.

The second argument is a dilemma. “Two Dogmas” shows that for Quine, all rational considerations are holophrastically empirical. Now, either pragmatic or linguistic considerations are rational or they are not. If they are rational, then they are holophrastically empirical. But if they are not rational, then they are not even rational, much less scientific, considerations. (I assume here that all scientific considerations are rational considerations.)

My conclusion is that Quine is a holist sectarian whenever he states any reasons of any kind to prefer any theory to an observationally equivalent theory. It also follows that there can be no reasons of any kind for preferring any theory to a holophrastically equivalent theory. This includes pragmatic reasons. And that is a stunning indictment of Carnap, whose purely pragmatic preference of one scientific framework to another can be itself neither scientific nor rational nor empirical, since for him it is external to any scientific, rational, or empirical framework.

5. Five Objections

I proceed to consider some main objections to my interpretation.

First, one might object that Carnap’s philosophy is itself a framework to be pragmatically chosen or rejected, including its analytic-synthetic distinction. My reply is that this is more a reductio of Carnap than an objection to the present paper. There would be no significant difference between Carnap and Quine indeed, if Carnap eventually came to adopt Quine’s philosophy for pragmatic reasons! But we must not confuse Carnap’s philosophy as it actually is with what, according to itself, it might eventually be changed into. Would we say that because Plato and Aristotle admit dialectical method as a way to revise views, so that their views might eventually be changed into each other’s, there is no substantive difference between their views? Certainly Quine admits that his own framework can change, but for all that he rejects Carnap.

Second, Carnap is arguably a meaning holist much like Quine, pace Quine’s attribution of individual empirical contents to Carnap’s observation statements. My reply is that this makes no difference. For even if we assume that Carnap holds not merely an epistemic or “confirmation” holism, but a meaning or “empirical content” holism that differs from
Quine’s only in that Carnap does not extend it to metaphysical theses or to analytic truths, this “only” concedes everything to my view. Of course, if Carnap were a meaning holist across the board, he might become a metaphysical realist like Quine. But this is idle. And in fact, Carnap is no meaning holist. Tomida and a very late Quine agree that texts in *The Logical Syntax of Language* show that Carnap “was ready to accept” the holism of “Two Dogmas.” But they find Carnap “ready to accept” Quine’s holism on the basis of texts which do not even appear to deny the analytic-synthetic distinction, and which assert at most that there is no statement whose truth-value is immune from revision due to recalcitrant experience. George quotes the key text from Carnap’s *The Logical Syntax of Language*:

> No rule of the physical language is definitive; all rules are laid down with the reservation that they may be altered as soon as it seems expedient to do so. This applies not only to the [physical] rules but also to the [logical] rules, including those of mathematics. In this respect, there are only differences in degree; certain rules are more difficult to renounce than others.\(^\dagger\)

Quine, George, and Tomida forget that in this work, Carnap still holds that analytic sentences have “no real content,” and that only synthetic sentences can be scientific or empirical.\(^\dagger\) And Carnap cannot accept Quine’s full meaning holism, i.e., his gradualism, without rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction.

Third, Paul O’Grady argues that “one can read Carnap as holding that all truths are contingent, all objects are natural objects, and all knowledge is acquired on the basis of empirical methods.”\(^\dagger\) Carnap’s “conception of the philosophical task” is based on three theses: (1) “there is no . . . ultimate furniture of the world,” (2) “the notion of reality is always relative to a constructional system,” and therefore (3) no such system is “a true representation of reality, it is a construct used in an instrumental manner.”\(^\dagger\)

So in one of Carnap’s recurring examples, the supposed debate between realists and idealists is in fact a debate about the relative resources of two kinds of language. . . . There is no question as to which one is the true account, rather a question of what can be done with the conceptual resources of each language.\(^\dagger\)

O’Grady says that by 1936 Carnap extends this deflationary account from ontology to theory of meaning and theory of knowledge as well, so that one’s choice of all three is “pragmatically determined.”\(^\dagger\) Philosophy retains a distinctive role in formulating these systems. Within a system, some statements may be analytic, but the choice of the system as a whole is purely pragmatic, based on our purposes at the moment. Therefore a system contains analytic statements only for formal reasons of clarifying a position, and not to “serve as an epistemological foundation” for “unrevisable a priori propositions” as being true in virtue of meanings alone.\(^\dagger\) Carnap finds this distinctive role of philosophical analysis to be itself pragmatic; for example, the distinction between an uninterpreted formal system and its empirical application “allowed Einstein to develop his account of relativity.”\(^\dagger\) O’Grady says that
“Two Dogmas” misses these views of Carnap, and therefore its arguments miss Carnap. O’Grady concludes that Quine does not espouse a wider pragmatism than Carnap, since they are equally deflationary about everything. He says they also equally reject analytic truth as an epistemological foundation of changeless a priori truth. He says their only difference is that Carnap assigns a distinctive analytic role to philosophy, while “Quine denies there is such a role and collapses philosophy into the overall scientific enterprise.”

My reply is that Quine is famous for arguing in “Two Dogmas” that there is no distinctive analytic role for philosophy in any sense. He is rejecting the whole earlier analytic movement and traditional a priori analysis as well. He is saying there is no such thing as philosophical analysis because the very idea is incoherent. This includes Carnapian analysis. And the view O’Grady finds in Carnap is precisely the view Quine criticizes at the end of “Two Dogmas.” Quine even cites the same paper O’Grady does, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” Surely O’Grady is aware that in “Two Dogmas,” Quine criticizes Carnap’s conception of analytic-relative-to-a-language-L. In this section of “Two Dogmas,” as well as in Quine’s criticism of “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” at the end of “Two Dogmas,” Quine is not concerned with analyticity as epistemological ground of changeless truths, but is widening his arguments to the point that statements cannot even be analytic relative to a language. O’Grady’s example of realism versus idealism, as showing that Carnap is the same as Quine except on whether philosophy has a distinctive analytic role, is particularly unfortunate. Quine is a robust metaphysical realist on holist empirical grounds precisely because he collapses philosophy into the overall scientific enterprise. Carnap finds metaphysical realism nonsensical precisely because he holds that philosophy’s analytic role is only relative to a language.

Fourth, on Quine’s own view that the two dogmas are the same, his defining analyticity for observation categoricals implies that synthetic observation categoricals have individual empirical contents. Yet such categoricals are “miniature theories,” hence only holophrastically empirical parts of scientific theory. It matters not whether their component stimulus meanings are physical stimulations of our sensory receptors or, following Davidson, the perceived objects outside our bodies. Either way they are physical, thus theoretical, thus only holophrastically empirical.

Fifth, the 1995 Quine admits that large parts of scientific theory need have no empirical content, and specifically that mathematics has no empirical content. He can do this because he defines a theory’s empirical content as an emergent property of the whole theory. This is not, of course, an objection to my definition of holophrastic equivalence, since counterpart sentences having no empirical content are cognitively equivalent.

My reply to the last two objections is that they are true, but at least they are consistent with Quine’s rejection of any general notion of analyticity or of individual statement empirical content; contrast Carnap with Quine. Thus Quine is reverting to Carnap’s views only to a degree; and the very reversion is holophrastically empirical.
6. Conclusion

Much of the “Two Dogmas” interest in the analytic-synthetic distinction is what the interest has always been: the epistemology of metaphysical realism. The interest in the analytic-synthetic distinction has never been merely in the logical classification of statements, but in the possibility of knowing an external world. And this was typically thought to depend in part on the empirical evidence, even when synthetic a priori knowledge was admitted.

Quine says his naturalistic epistemology “coincides with . . . traditional epistemology” in holding that, as he puts it, “our information about the world comes only through impacts on our sensory receptors.” Quine says it is one of the “truths, in physics and elsewhere,” that “external things are ultimately to be known only through their action on our bodies.” Quine adds, “I do not share Maxwell’s doctrine that ‘the external world is . . . unobservable’. On the contrary, the external world has had, as a theater of observation, few rivals.” Indeed, “publicly observable bodies . . . are what our firmest knowledge is about.” How far from Carnap can one get?

For Carnap and Quine alike, meaning and verification are tied. Both would agree that by definition we cannot observe unobserved or unobservable objects. Carnap concludes that metaphysical realism is empirically meaningless because it is unverifiable in the observational sense. But Quine concludes that metaphysical realism is empirically meaningful because it is verifiable in a holophrastically empirical sense, i.e., by indirect empirical evidence. Thus verificationism is implicitly ambiguous in the same way empirical equivalence is. Pragmatism is, too. Holist utility can allow sectarian preferences where observational utility cannot. For Quine, simplicity and conservatism are holophrastically empirical pragmatic evidence.

In terms of their pragmatic methodologies, both Quine and Carnap are open and liberal about allowing and exploring different theories and frameworks. But the similarity of their methodologies is a fig leaf barely hiding Quine’s holophrastically empirical arguments for realism. Just as Quine says in “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology,” Quine is radically more extensive in his pragmatism than Carnap precisely because Quine extends pragmatism to ontological statements which are literally nonsensical for Carnap.

In terms of history of philosophy, Carnap belongs to the modern way of questioning and rejecting metaphysics. His innovation is to make metaphysics neither analytic nor synthetic, but meaningless. But Quine returns to the traditional acceptance of metaphysically real physical objects. He says he departs from Carnap precisely by his “adoption of the word ‘ontology’ [from] traditional metaphysics [in a] sense . . . nuclear to its usage all along.” His innovation is to make metaphysics a posteriori through a holophrastic theory of evidence and of empirical content. Thus where Carnap discards all metaphysics as meaningless, Quine discards most metaphysics as primitive science, but admits metaphysical realism as the core of scientific theory, and as therefore more probably true than any other thesis. For Carnap, metaphysical realism is a “conception of nonempirical real-
For Quine, it is a conception of holophrastically empirical reality. I shall conclude by discussing the two most problematic texts. The first is in Quine:

"The fantasy of irresolubly rival systems of the world is a thought experiment out beyond where linguistic usage has been crystallized by use. No wonder the cosmic question whether to call two such world systems true should simmer down, bathetically, to a question of words. Hence also, meanwhile, my vacillation.

Fare these conventions as they may, the rival theories describe one and the same world. Limited to our human terms and devices, we grasp the world variously. I think of the disparate ways of getting at the diameter of an impenetrable sphere: we may pinion the sphere in calipers or we may girdle it with a tape measure and divide by pi, but there is no getting inside."139

The first paragraph states Quine’s holist sectarian preference for observational ecumenicism over observational sectarianism, at least if alien terms are not involved. The second paragraph explains that this sectarian preference is based on his prior sectarian admission of metaphysical realism. He prefers observational ecumenicism precisely because the external world is like an impenetrable sphere which we can only describe differently in different theories. For Carnap, an impenetrable world is a literally nonsensical world. But for Quine, the impenetrable sphere of metaphysical realism is the only feasible core of science, since all the indirect evidence favors it. And it is holophrastically penetrable on holist sectarian grounds. In fact, Quine penetrates it quite often.

The second problematic text is in the post-“Two Dogmas” Carnap. In 1956 Carnap admits that theoretical terms cannot be fully interpreted by observational terms, and are meaningful only “relative to a [whole] theory T.”140 He admits that “the class of significant sentences of [a theory] includes certain sentences for which no observational evidence can ever be relevant.”141 He admits, “In physics great progress was made only by the construction of theories referring to unobservable events and micro-entities.”142 He still does not abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction. He sharply distinguishes logical terms from physical terms.143 In 1966 Carnap says in *Philosophical Foundations of Physics*, “A theoretical term can never be explicitly defined on the basis of observational terms.”144 He still rejects metaphysics,145 and gives a new analysis of the analytic-synthetic distinction.146 But—and this is the problematic text—Carnap follows Nagel in finding the difference between realist and instrumentalist talk “essentially linguistic.”147

In the problematic texts, Carnap and Quine take Nagel’s Orwellian view on which all forms of talk are equal, but instrumentalist talk is more equal than realist talk precisely because the difference is merely linguistic.148 But this is correct only on the observational level. Holophrastically, Quine prefers realism. Even Carnap comes to prefer realist talk. In 1963 Carnap says, “If ‘realism’ is understood as preference for the reistic language over the phenomenal language, then I am also a realist. However, if ‘realism’ is understood, in the customary sense, as an ontological thesis, then the argu-
ments against it were given in my monograph."149 In 1974 Carnap deletes the problematic “essentially linguistic” text from An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, which is the second edition of Philosophical Foundations of Physics.150

I agree with Parrini that to understand Carnap, we must distinguish external realism versus external instrumentalism from internal realism versus internal instrumentalism. The external debate is whether there are real theoretical entities beyond phenomena, or whether only phenomena are real and theoretical entities are fictional constructs. The internal debate is whether theoretical terms are reducible to observation terms. The later Carnap rejects the external debate as nonsensical, but comes to prefer an internal (empirical) realism of physical language to internal instrumentalism, i.e., to methodological phenomenalism.151 The reist or thing language, not to mention the (micro-)physical language, is now overwhelmingly preferred to the phenomenal language for scientific purposes (not: reasons).152 But for Quine, the two debates are one. Quine says “the quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical notation is not to be distinguished from a quest of ultimate categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality.”153 The key is description.154

Quine and the later Carnap have much the same technical reasons for accepting scientific realism: the preclusion of communally checkable evidence, and of communication at all, by the privacy of sensation-language; the irreducibility of theoretical terms to observation terms; and the overwhelming simplicity and conservatism of micro-theory.155 But they are worlds apart in how they construe or categorize those reasons. For Carnap, such framework-external considerations can only be purely pragmatic grounds for preferring realist language, i.e., internal realism. For Quine, they can only be rational evidence for the truth of metaphysical realism.

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NOTES

1. Ecumenicism is the view that empirically equivalent theories or ontologies are equally warranted, and nothing further can be meaningfully said. Sectarianism is the opposing view that at most one such theory is true, and the rest are false.


8. Ibid., 21.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 22.


12. Ibid.; Word and Object, 1, 2, 4.

13. Quine, Word and Object, 1.

14. Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 1, 2; Word and Object, 22.

15. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 26–27.


17. We see the same pattern in Word and Object, summarized in the preface, ix; see Donald Davidson, “Quine’s Externalism,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (2003): 291.


21. Ibid., see 334–338.

22. When Carnap says “that, if two men wish to find out whether or not their views on certain objects agree, they must first of all use a common language to make sure that they are talking about the same objects” in George, “On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It,” 17, quoting Carnap, “Replies and Systematic Exhibitions,” in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. Paul Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1963), 929–930, we cannot take this as a private language argument for metaphysical realism unless we take Carnap as destroying his classical position.

23. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, 282–287; see 273B275; Meaning and Necessity, 207; see 206.

24. That private language arguments do not apply to certain kinds of empirically unreal ducks, such as dreamed or imagined ducks, is misleading. Wooden decoys are metaphysically real decoys, since the private language arguments apply; but they are not empirically real ducks.

25. Berkeley argues from perceptual and scientific considerations as much as any realist. Quine’s acceptance of Johnson’s refutation of Berkeley (Quine, Word and Object, 3, 17–18) is an acceptance of an empirical argument for metaphysical realism. Quine regards Johnson’s argument as primitive, but as sound as far as it goes. We must not be confused by the fact that kicking a stone is also evidence that it is empirically real. We must credit Johnson and Quine with knowing that Berkeley rejects only metaphysical realism, and accepts empirical realism. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in Principles, Dialogues, and Correspondence, ed. Colin Turbayne (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 34–36. Compare Kant on transcendental idealism and empirical realism. Again, no sane person would reject empirical realism, i.e., classify known wooden decoys as real living ducks.


27. Ibid., 45–46.

29. Ibid., 22.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 23.
35. Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 19.
37. Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 34.
38. Quine, Word and Object, 4.
40. Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 36.
42. Ibid.
43. Quine, Word and Object, 1–5; see 17–18; The Roots of Reference, 52–53.
Carnap says, “Construction theory represents the neutral foundation which [realism and idealism] have in common. They diverge only in the field of metaphysics . . .” ibid., 286, Carnap’s emphasis. See Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, 332.
47. Ibid., 283.
51. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 7–8; Word and Object, 108.
52. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 12–13, my emphasis.
56. Carnap, Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, 328; see 333–334.
57. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 13.
58. Quine, Theories and Things, 184; compare Peirce.
60. Quine, From Stimulus to Science, 67. Quine says, “Scientific method is the way to truth, but it offers even in principle no unique definition of truth. Any so-called pragmatic definition of truth is doomed to failure equally,” Quine, Word and Object, 23.
63. Ibid., 16–17, 20, 22, 31, 35.
64. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, 20.
66. George, “On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It,” 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16; 20
n. 22.

71. Yasuhiko Tomida, “Interview between W. V. Quine and Yasuhiko Tomida,” in *Quine and the Contemporary American Philosophy* (Kyoto: Sekaishisosha, 1994), 4–51. The 1994 Quine is not ready to say that Carnap ever was a gradualist. *Ibid.* George says Quine begs the question against Carnap by assuming gradualism. “On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It,” 16. George says that Quine’s “linguacentrism leads” Quine to reject Carnap’s distinction merely because holism happens to be Quine’s theory. *Ibid.*, 15–16. But Quine adopts gradualism only after giving lengthy arguments against Carnap’s distinction. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 20–42. If anyone, it is George who begs the question. He ostensibly wants to know if anything hangs on the dispute about the analytic-synthetic distinction. But when anything hangs on it, he dismisses it because it is “conditioned” on the distinction. George, “On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It,” 19.

74. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 45.
78. See Quine, *Pursuit of Truth*, 12.

81. *Ibid.*, 246. Indeed, all science begins with indirect evidence. Quine says that “familiar physical things” give ‘the key words ‘understood,’ ‘real,’ and ‘evidence’ . . . the very denotations to which they mainly owe such sense as they make to us,” *Word and Object*, 3. For familiar physical things are theoretical posits “far in excess of any available data,” *Word and Object*, 22.
88. *Ibid.* This is the first of three ways to define cognitive equivalence Quine discusses, *Pursuit of Truth*, 54–55. He regards it as stating the right idea, or ideal. He finds the other two ways hopelessly limited in scope of applicability.
90. *Ibid.*, 17. There can also be many kinds or degrees of empirical equivalence intermediate between observational equivalence and holophrastic equivalence. For example, we may say that theories are *mostly equivalent* if most of the theses in either have cognitively equivalent counterparts in the other, using “cognitively equivalent” in Quine’s sense. We may also say that theories have *deeper level* empirical equivalence if their deeper theses have cognitively equivalent counterparts, and that they have *shallower level* empirical equivalence if their shallower theses have cognitively equivalent counterparts. Theories can be 90% equivalent, and so on.
91. If Quine can admit robust realism because his own theory contains the alien term “robust realism” (the term is alien to Carnap’s theory, not to Quine’s), may not
others then meaningfully retain “essence,” “grace,” and “nirvana” in their own the-
ories? We may even reasonably suppose that they are equally simple, on an
exchange of any primitive term (“robustly real,” “essence,” “grace,” or “nirvana”) for
any of the others. But Quine can still argue that his private language arguments are
holophrastically empirically stronger than, say, arguments for essence (Edmund
Husserl), numinous grace (Rudolf Otto), or nirvana (W. T. Stace).
92. Quine, “Reply to Roger F. Gibson, Jr.”
93. Ibid., 157.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., 101.
103. Ibid., 100–101.
107. Ibid., 234.
108. Ibid., 251; see 225–226.
109. Ibid., 225, 251–252; Word and Object, 1–4; see 17–18.
110. Carnap, Necessity, 208.
111. Richard Creath, “Introduction” to Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap
Correspondence and Related Work, ed. Richard Creath (Berkeley: University of
112. Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 92, 94.
113. Tomida, “Interview between W. V. Quine and Yasuhiko Tomida.”
114. Ibid.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), 318; the bracketed words are bracketed as in
George’s quote, George, “On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It,” 5.
117. Paul O’Grady, “Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophy and
118. Ibid., 1022–1033.
119. Ibid., 1025.
120. Ibid., 1023.
121. Ibid., 1025.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid., 1017, 1027.
124. Ibid., 1025, 1027.
125. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, 45–46.
126. Ibid., 45.
127. Quine, From Stimulus to Science, 45; compare Word and Object, 55, 65–69.
128. Quine, From Stimulus to Science, 26, 43.
129. Davidson, “Quine’s Externalism.”
130. Quine, From Stimulus to Science, 48–49, 53.
132. Quine, From Stimulus to Science, 45.
133. Quine, Pursuit of Truth, 19.
155. Parrini perceptively says that the later Carnap abandons his earlier “coherence” conception of empirical reality for a pure “relative to framework” conception, *ibid.*, 262–263, 270–274, citing Alberto Coffa, “Idealism and the Aufbau,” in *The Heritage of Logical Positivism*, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985). Indeed, the later Carnap identifies the question whether existential statements are metaphysical or empirical with whether they are meant “absolutely and objectively [or] relative to this or that language, or relative to this or that person,” that is, with whether they are “meant as external statements” or “merely as internal statements,” Carnap, “Replies and Systematic Exhibitions,” 873.