Op.Knot 1
by
Dennis Wombell



In 1953 I was a Platoon Commander with 18 Federal Jungle Company (FJC) operating in the deep jungles of North Perak, which included the Thai border area. Up to that time we were not permitted to cross into Thailand, even in hot pursuit, and it was somewhat frustrating to hear rumours of the existence of large communist camps within easy striking distance of the border and to which the Thais turned a blind eye, on the understanding that the communists would refrain from doing anything nasty on their own doorstep. This situation came to an end when agreement was reached with the Thai government, to allow Malayan Police units to cross the border in hot pursuit, or to carry out specific operations upto a depth of forty miles into Thailand.
In preparation for a series of initial operations, discreet aerial surveillance had pinpointed a number of large camps in the Betong Salient - that projection of Thai territory surrounded on three sides by the Malayan border, in which the Malayan Communist Party had established a safe haven from which to conduct their war over the border - and it was decided to take advantage of the element of surprise in attacking and destroying these first. The covert aerial recces were necessarily sketchy and it was not absolutely certain whether or not some of the camps were occupied. One large camp however was certainly seen to be occupied, and consisted of a good number of substantial atap huts and a parade ground with the red flag flying above it. A mouth-watering prospect for those of us who spent our lives hunting for needles in haystacks South of the border! Obviously this had to be the primary target with other camps in the area designated secondary targets.
18th and 20th (Gurkha) FJC were tasked with the series of operations which were to follow. They were to last several months and were designated `Operation Knot`, the first phase being `Op Knot 1`. This was to be carried out by two groups, who were to attack the primary and the most promising of the secondary targets simultaneously. The first group, consisting of the Gurkha Company and two Malay platoons from 18FJC, was to be commanded by Johnnie West, with Ben Gard of 20 Company as Second-in-Command. I commanded one of the Malay platoons and Police Lieutenant John Abercrombie the other. The second group was commanded by Garry Lockington and acted independently. I will only deal here with the first group.
In order to avoid alerting the terrorist community in the whole of the Betong Salient, where, it was obvious, they felt secure and unthreatened, it was decided that we should enter the jungle in the proximity of Kampong Lalang, a very small Malay village on the Grik-Kroh road, well
south of the Thai border and the target area. Johnnie West, Ben Gard and myself travelled up to the area during the afternoon to recce the entry point in preparation for the main force who were to arrive and move into the jungle in the dark in the early hours of the morning. The three of us spent the night in the cells at Kampong Lalang Police Station. This afforded a great deal of amusement (the first and only time I have had to spend the night in a Police cell - I don`t know about the others!) the main topic of conversation during our incarceration being Johnnie`s enthusiasm for his new girl friend - a young lady by the name of Wendy - soon afterwards to become his wife. The rest of the force arrived in the early hours and we stumbled our way into the jungle by the light of dim torches, until we were well out of sight of the road. At day break and after a cold breakfast, we commenced our march North towards the Thai border and the Betong Salient.
We had anticipated that the march would be an arduous one. The distance as the crow flies was about eleven miles, which meant almost double that on the ground, and that against the `grain`, with innumerable hills to climb and rivers to cross. It was calculated that it would take us eight days to reach the target, and in the event this proved to be accurate. This made re-supply a problem, since normally jungle patrols would be supplied by airdrop every four days, and to carry eight days rations as well as weapons and ammunition on such a long and difficult march, whilst not impossible, was not desirable if we were to arrive at the target area with men fit to do battle. The problem was solved by having two platoons of 18FJC act as porters, and carry two days rations for the main force before returning to camp. We then had to carry six days rations.
One of the conditions of the agreement with the Thai government was, that we had to be accompanied on all cross border operations by representatives of the Thai Police, and on this occasion we had almost a full platoon with us, with two or three officers. They were nice chaps and aquitted themselves well on the march, although we did make an effort to keep them well back and out of harms way. After two years of jungle bashing in North Perak, my somewhat hardened and jungle-wise Malays were somewhat bemused at the carefree antics of the Thais, who tended to treat the whole excercise like a picnic, However, with a little guidance they soon packed away their shiny chromium-plated cap badges, their white scarves and towels, and learnt to conduct themselves in a more soldierly manner.
Navigation was difficult and at the same time the most important aspect of the march. The whole operation depended upon our locating a specific point in a vast area of primitive and largely unknown jungle, using maps which, once over the border in South Thailand, were at the very best, rudimentary. Much of the area on the maps was obscured by cloud cover and the position of many of the rivers only `approximate`, and in some places shown in almost straight lines. I acted as a leading scout, finding the best route and the best ground, `steered` by Johnnie West and Ben Gard who were then free to concentrate on their maps.
The march went without incident, or certainly none that I remember, and we duly arrived at a river which we calculated to be two or three hours march from the ridge above the terrorist camp. It was decided that we would spend that night and the following day by the river, to allow the men to relax, recover from the march, bathe and to clean themselves up, before climbing the ridge during the following night in readiness for the attack on the camp at first light the following morning. We had a relaxing day but silence had to be observed and no fires were allowed - we were much too near the enemy camp. However, later in the morning and as the day grew warmer, I suddenly heard singing, shouting and the playing of a guitar. The Thai contingent had decided that they might as well enjoy themselves, and were having a great time playing in the river with a musical accompaniment from the bank. It was the first time I or anyone else had seen the guitar and God knows where it had sprung from. We very quickly put a stop to that! Fortunately, no harm was done, probably because there was a high ridge between ourselves and the Communists.
In the late afternoon we packed our kit, had a last cold meal, cleaned and checked our weapons and ammunition and made our way slowly and quietly to the top of the ridge beneath which, if our navigation had been accurate, was a large Communist camp. It was a tense time as we sat, lined up on the ridge, in the growing darkness, listening for any telltale sound that would tell us we were in the right place and that all we had done was not wasted. Suddenly, there in the jungle, remote from any form of habitation and through which we had marched for several days without seeing any form of life, there arose from the river beneath us, the sound of men singing, and I shall never ever forget the eerie thrill of it. The comrades were singing their marching songs before lights-out and we were in the exact right place. We had, between us, performed a navigational miracle.
There was much quiet, though spirited, discussion as to how we were to attack the camp at dawn. Our Gurkha platoon commanders wanted to creep down and behead the sentries in the night - but then they always did. In retrospect, perhaps we should have let them. I would have preferred a straightforward frontal attack with all guns blazing, but Johnnie decided upon a properly planned attack, putting stops to the left, to the right and to the rear of the camp before carrying out a frontal attack with the Gurkhas, thereby allowing no one to escape. Accordingly, John Abercrombie was to go to the left with his platoon and take up position on the riverside track from the camp, whilst I was to go to the right, leave a platoon on the track at that side, and then climb the hill behind the camp to cut off the enemy retreat at the rear.
At first light we started to move into position. Abercrombie moved down the hill to the left and I moved down to the right, leaving Johnnie and Ben with the Gurkhas in line on the ridge. They were to give us time to put out our stops before moving slowly down the hill and then charging headlong into the camp.
As I moved down to the right and neared the river, we came across a large well-built atap hut
immediately in our path. We approached it carefully, assuming that it was part of the camp and was possibly occupied. In fact it was a large store, full of food, uniforms and equipment and well outside the camp. We were elated. These were terrorists on a grand scale compared with the shabby deprived little groups we had been used to. Just as we continued on our way, heavy firing broke out from the other side of the camp and I assumed that the attack had gone in before we had had time to put our stops out. We hurtled down the hill to the riverside track and, as we reached it, much heavier fire broke out from the direction of the camp. I left a platoon on the track to block it and then started to climb the hill on the other side of the river to block off the rear of the camp. Unfortunately we were too late. The escaping terrorists were already above us on the hill and we came under heavy fire. Eventually all firing ceased and, leaving the platoon to cover the hill, I made my way to the camp which was within a very short distance. The place was in turmoil, with two dead terrorists in the middle of the parade ground, and Gurkhas running around in all directions looking for someone to kill! Then Abercrombie`s platoon appeared from the track they had been blocking, carrying his body and that of his Sergeant, Abu Bakar.
It transpired that upon reaching the riverside track that he was to block, and having put his men in position, Abercrombie, accompanied by his sergeant, walked down the track to investigate - probably to see whether he could see any sign of the camp. As he turned a corner on the track, he suddenly found himself in a small clearing. It was a perfectly constructed sentry position with, at the far end of the clearing, a large fallen tree, behind which sat a sentry on a bench with a bren gun pointing down the track. As the two men appeared he opened fire, hitting Abercrombie between the eyes and Sergeant Abu Bakar in the heart. Both were killed instantly.
This of course was the signal for the Communists to put into action their well-rehearsed escape drill. At the same time, Johnnie West and Ben Gard had no alternative but to lead their Gurkha attacking force at full tilt down the hill and into the camp, knowing that the stops could not have had time to take up their positions. The main body of the terrorists, leaving two men to fight a very courageous rearguard action to delay the attackers, and carrying only their weapons and ammunition, fled up the hill at the rear of the camp, from which they fired down on my platoon as they ran. The two men left behind were very quickly killed by the Gurkhas and the camp overrun. An attempt was made to pursue the fleeing terrorists but they had the advantage of the precipitous slope up which they had climbed ahead of us, and, upon reaching the rocky ridge-top they dispersed and melted into the jungle. This brought the action to an end.
After putting out sentries, the men were dispersed about the camp in which we were to stay for three or four days before continuing with the further phases of the operation. Radio contact was established with Headquarters in Ipoh, and arrangements made to evacuate the dead. We were then able to inspect the camp.
It was a substantial establishment, with well built huts set around a parade ground over which flew the red flag of the Malayan Communists Party. Apart from barrack rooms, there was a lecture hall, armoury, cookhouse and well-stocked stores. The defences were well planned and consisted of trenches, strong-points and well sited sentry positions with cleared killing grounds. There were even two bicycles with which it was just possible to ride down the rough riverside track to the nearest Thai village some miles away.
It was of course very disappointing that such a complex operation, so well planned and executed, had been largely aborted by the carelessness of one officer, who, sadly, paid for his mistake with his life.
Success however is not solely measured in the number of kills. The information gathered from the camp in documents and photographs was incalcuble. The operation also signalled to the Malayan Communist Party that the days of their safe haven in South Thailand were at an end, and they would no longer be in a position to thumb their noses at us as they disappeared over the border into Thailand.
On a personal note I shall always remember an experience on the following day. During the operation I contracted amoebic dysentry and had it quite badly. It was also pouring with rain, and, as I squatted over the Communist-made open-air bamboo loo feeling unutterably miserable and soaking wet, my eyes alighted on a piece of newspaper left behind by the terrorists. A large advertisement read : "You Can Be In Belfast Tonight For £10" My God, I thought. If only!
Copyright Dennis Wombell

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